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Abstract 
Due to the sink node crucial position, its location privacy is becoming one of the major issues in wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs) which requires ultimate protection. Particularly, the WSNs successfulness is endanger as the wireless transmission nodes 
are susceptive to illicit tracing and detection. While privacy of the message can be ensured through encryption content, this paper 
formalizes a novel efficient privacy preserving scheme to secure sink node location. The aim is to keep the location privacy of 
the sink node from being tracked using the traffic flow passive analysis. F-CSH is based on the concealing of the location of the 
main sink using fake sink holes been elected using fuzzy score function. In addition, comprehensive simulations proved that the 
proposed scheme significantly upgrades both delivery time and conservation energy cost compared with existing strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, with the remarkable advance of electronic systems fabrication, there has been increased interest 
in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [1], [2]. Due to the bright and interesting future promised the world of 
information technology, WSNs have been technically identified as one of the most important technologies to be 
envisioned in different critical applications including military and civilian monitoring [1], [3], [4]. 
A WSN typically consists of large number of distributed small, cheap, constrained energy and 
computational utilities sensor nodes. Sensor nodes cooperatively pass their data through the sensor network to the 
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most powerful node named main sink node or Base Station (BS) to be processed [5]. In spite of WSN popularity, 
any failure or physical attack exposure to BS leads to collapse of the entire sensor network [6]. Due to the open 
nature of WSNs, wireless communications are relatively vulnerable to be intercepted in an unauthorized manner, 
eavesdropped and traced by adversary [7].  
More specifically, privacy threats in sensor networks are classified into two categories: data packets 
privacy, and contextual privacy [8]. In the case of data packets privacy, threat adversary can detect and tamper the 
packets sent over the network. Although message confidentiality can be countered through intensive cryptographic 
of the packets content instead of real identities, it is possible for the adversaries to identify and monitor the intensity 
of the communication patterns with an appropriate radio receiver no matter whether messages are encrypted or not. 
Concerning contextual privacy, it deals with the protection of the context associated with broadcasting of sensitive 
data such as the location of the message originator, the generated message time, locations of monitored objects and 
BS etc. Moreover, in the worst case, an anonymous may be able to undetectably take control of some sensor nodes, 
inject false data packets or reprogram the sensor nodes [9], [10]. 
Additionally, because of scarce energy in WSNs domain, concealing the location privacy became an 
extremely challenging task. Otherwise, the WSNs can be exposed to malicious traffic analysis and accordingly the 
significant contextual information to be carried out and exploited by an adversary. Therefore, sink nodes location 
privacy requires ultimate protection. Generally two methods for unauthorized sink locating with no access to the 
message content but message existence: traffic-analysis and packet-tracing. It is based on that the sensors closer to 
the BS receive and transmit greater volume of packets than sensors further away from BS. Obviously, the location of 
the sink is inferred based on the traffic densities analysis of different locations. This process takes long time as the 
adversary has to move from location to location and stay at each location long enough such that sufficient data can 
be gathered for computing the traffic rate [11]. Considering packet-tracing, transmission link could be revealed 
when tracing the transmitted consecutive packets by nodes towards sink. When a traditional single-path routing 
protocol is implemented, the network is extremely vulnerable to the packet-tracing attack, since the routing paths are 
specified and directed to the sink. By eavesdropping, an adversary is able to perform hop-by-hop tracing along path 
towards the receiver for each packet overheard.  
In this paper, we focus on studying concealing the sink node location with the efficient scheme in-terms of 
the safeguarding sink location privacy against threats with acceptable energy consumption. We proposed a novel 
scheme named fuzzy based concealing for sink node using fake holes (F-CSH). The proposed scheme is based on 
creating dummy sink holes to be elected by nodes to mislead attackers and enhance the sink privacy strength with 
random selection of neighbour for the real packet transmission each time. Under such a protection scheme, an 
adversary can’t identify the right direction to reach the real sink [12]. Moreover, simulation results also are carried 
out to demonstrate the efficient of the proposed scheme in protecting the location of the sink with efficient power 
consumption. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes related privacy works in 
WSNs. Section 3 explains the statement of system models followed by the description of the scheme of protecting 
the sink location privacy in section 4. Section 5 evaluates the simulation results and performance analysis and the 
overhead of the privacy protocol. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related work 
In WSNs, there are different representative schemes for source-location node’s privacy. Bidi Ying et. al. 
in [13] proposed a Concealing of the Sink Location (CSL) technique, which is based on the use of fake message 
injection. CSL starts with topology discovery phase where the sink broadcasts encrypted message and the 
intermediate nodes forward only one copy of such an encrypted message. Several nodes are randomly selected to 
generate Fake messages of the same size to disable monitoring the traffic volume. After a tree-like structure has 
been generated and during the data transmission phase, CSL instructs each node to send the same number of 
messages. Therefore, the attacker cannot identify the sink node. Obviously this scheme consumes the limited node's 
residual energy and decreases the overall network's lifetime. 
Deng et al. [14] proposed Differential Enforced Fractal Propagation (DEFP) against traffic analysis attack 
for BS location privacy, where every node in the network has to transmit messages at a constant rate. However, the 
traffic-analysis attack is not a preferable measure for an adversary. In addition, this approach introduced extra delay 
for delivering packets. Xinfeng Li et al. [15] centralized scheme is based on several fake packets injection to conceal 
the real packet during data transmission period. BS randomly selects a common node to be the pseudo BS. However, 
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randomization leads to much longer packet delivery latency and heavier workload in addition to more energy 
consumed if the nodes are away from the pseudo BSs. Our proposal in this paper tries to solve the problems of the 
previous schemes through fake sink node.  
 
3. Statement of system models 
In this section, the sensor network and adversary models are defined; then a new scheme for protecting sink node 
location privacy is proposed. 
Sensor network model: The monitored space A is described as a 2-D environment, with length L and width W. 
The WSN densely randomly deployed is composed of one sink and large number of homogeneous and immobile 
sensors with limited energy and computation capabilities. Without loss of generality, one sink is assumed in the 
network to collect data packet where it can be easily extending to multiple sinks. These sensors can communicate 
with each other directly or indirectly based on the distance and transmission range. In addition, sink node is assumed 
to have sufficient computation and storage capabilities to collect the sensed data packets via various neighbouring 
nodes. Furthermore, the proposed system has the following assumptions: The content of data packet will be 
guaranteed by an encryption technique for keeping the message secure. However, the encryption process is beyond 
paper scope [16], [17]. The node concatenates several data packets received from different nodes and then resubmit 
the result as a new packet. Hence, every packet delivered in the network has the same packet size thus the hacker 
cannot pinpoint the sink location for the size of the data packet. The sink node is assumed to passively receive 
packets with no rely on sending requests. 
Adversary model: The adversary’s model is assumed to be able to perform traffic-analysis and packet-tracing 
attacks, with the following features: The adversaries have appropriate computation capability and sufficient data 
storage memory; while being equipped with supporting devices. The attacker can’t get the content of the packets 
caused by encryption; thus unable to distinguish between original and fake messages. The attacker doesn’t actively 
interfere with regular network communications but can passively monitor and eavesdrop the communication 
channels to remain untraced and hidden from the network operator.  
 
4. Novel Scheme of Fuzzy Based Concealing Sink Node with Fake Holes (F-CSH) 
 
Fuzzy logic concept is almost derived from the theory of fuzzy sets which related to objects classes with un-sharp 
boundaries where membership or truth of any statement is a matter of degree. Fuzzy logic was first introduced by 
Lotfi A. Zadeh in the mid-1960s for representing uncertain and imprecise knowledge [18]. It provides an approximate 
but efficient means of describing the behaviour of systems that are too complicated, ill- specified, or not easily 
analyzed mathematically. As considered before, N heterogeneous are randomly deployed nodes. All sensors generate 
m messages with the same size L bits. In this section, we introduce our concealing scheme (F-CSH). F-CSH is based 
on using fake sink holes -elected using fuzzy score function- to keep the location privacy of the sink node from 
being tracked using the traffic flow passive analysis. F-CSH also introduces additional difficulty on the traffic 
analyzers by selecting random neighbours for forwarding the real packets. Our proposed algorithm starts with 
Neighbours discovery. Then, the network lifetime is divided into rounds; each round is composed of two phases, 
fake sink holes announcement phase and Data delivery paths phase as follow:  
Phase 1 “Neighbours discovery”: Directly after deployment, the sink node broadcasts identification message 
holding the id, as shown in equation 1. Each node, using the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication) of this 
message [19], estimates how far from the sink node. This can be easily extended to multiple sink networks. Then, as 
shown in equation 2, each node broadcasts message holding the node’s own identifier (id) and the distance to the 
sink node (d), with limited power to be heard by the neighbour nodes (M). Neighbour nodes save the received 
information to be used in further routing. Equation 2 is for node i, with identifier idi, distance from sink di and 
neighbour nodes Mi . 
Phase 2 “Fake Sink holes announcement”: During this phase, nodes calculate their fuzzy score. The fuzzy 
variables considered in our proposal are: the residual energy which is the current energy of the node, connectivity 
factor be the number of neighbour nodes and the centrality factor as the average summation of the distances 
between the node and neighbour node. Equation 3 shows the centrality factor of node i, where Mi is the number of 
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neighbour nodes for node i and dij be the distance between node i and neighbour node j. 
          Sink  (idsink) → Nodes (1)              Nodei  (idi | di) → Mi (2)              CFi= (Σ1<j<Mi dij) / Mi   (3) 
Nodes broadcast their fuzzy score, with the highest be the fake sink holes of the current round. Other nodes 
select their fake sink holes based on the fuzzy score or RSSI [19]. The used linguistic variables for the crisp input 
are limited to three variables which are low, medium and high for the residual energy and connectivity factor while 
far, adequate and close confined to centrality factor as shown in Fig. (1). The fuzzy set for the output which is the 
score of the node is represented using five linguistic variables which are very low, low, medium, high, and very high. 
Defuzzification process is done by Center of Gravity (COG). 
Phase 3 “Data delivery paths”: F-CSH assumes multi-hop network with no direct path from node to the real 
sink node. Nodes send multi-casted packet holding the address of its fake sink hole and randomly one of the nearest 
neighbours to the targeted real sink node. This process is declared using the multi-casted destination equation 4, 
where FSi is the fake sink selected by Nodei for the current round and RMi is the randomly selected neighbour for 
Nodei. Thus the size of the data packet sent to the fake sink hole is of the same size that sent to the random 
neighbour, thus the traffic analyzer cannot identify the real sink form the packet size. This method is repeated by the 
intermediate nodes on the path from the source node to the real sink. This introduces different paths in each time, in 
addition to different fake sink holes by each new fake sink holes announcement phase. The intelligent fake node 
selection approaches is presented in Fig. (2), as shown, s be the source sensor node, randomly selected one of its near 
neighbour nodes to the real sink. The figure shows the repeating of the data delivery, where each neighbour node also 
randomly select one of its near neighbour nodes to the real sink then forward the data to the selected neighbour and 
the selected fake sink hole. Figure (3) summarizes the 3 phases of the proposed F-CSH scheme. 
                                                          Nodei (Data) → (FSi,RMi) (4) 
5. Simulation Results and Performance Analysis 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. Experiments are performed on our own 
simulation written on Matlab. In our simulation, we use N as the number of nodes N=1000 deployed in an area 
A=1000 x 1000 m2. Nodes transmission range is set to L=150m. The initial energy of the node is assumed to be 10J. 
In addition, for simplicity, the size of the message sent by a node as well as the aggregated message from the 
intermediate nodes is set to 4000 bit message. To test our proposal in this paper, the selected energy model follows 
the footsteps the one proposed in [20]. The energy expended for Nodei during transmission of a M bit message for a 
distance d is as shown in equation (5), On the other hand, energy expended during receiving M bit message is as 
shown in equation (6). 
                                              ETX(M,d)=Eelec . M + Eamp . M . dY  (5)       ERX(M) = Eelec . M (6) 
where Eelec is the energy dissipated by turning the radio circuit for either sending or receiving and its value 
is equal to 50 nJ/bit. Eamp is the energy dissipated using the transmitter amplifier and its value is equal to 100 
pJ/bit/m2. Y is the path loss exponent and equal to 2. Let for Nodei, Ki be the sub-set of neighbour nodes Mi that are 
the nearest to the sink node and Vi be the nearest sub-set of the available FSHr (fake sink holes) for the current round 
(r), as shown in equation (7). K is application dependant variable, bigger K value results in higher concealing 
probability.                                                      Ki كؿ	ሺ͹ሻ 
For the current round, the number of unique combinations for Nodei to select for mulit-casted packet is (Ki.Vi). 
While the probability for Nodei to select certain fake sink hole is (1/|Vi|) while the probability to select certain 
neighbour node for forwarding the current data to the real sink is (1/|Ki|). Thus the probability to select certain pair 
(fake node, neighbour node) is (1/(Vi . Ki)). With probability of certain set of pairs be selected starting from the 
source node to the sink be as (1/(∏SourceNode<j<Pre_sink (Vj . Kj))). Let di be the distance from the source node (Nodei) to 
the sink, in terms of hop count. Thus (di-1) neighbour nodes along this path will follow the data path delivery phase 
by selecting fake sink hole and real neighbour to the real sink. With (2.di) packets been generated, di packets for the 
fake sink holes and di packets for the real path. The number of the unique paths, form the source node (Nodei) to the 
sink be (di+1), one real path with (di) fake paths, with probability to follow the real path be (1/(di+1)). This 
probability mainly depends on the path length and the number of nodes in both sets; and decreases dramatically for 
the random selection of the next neighbour in each Data delivery paths phase and the random change of the fake 
sink holes each Fake Sink holes announcement phase. 
Consider CSL scheme described above, several nodes are randomly selected to generate fake messages of the 
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same size to disable monitoring the traffic volume. After a tree-like structure has been generated and during the data 
transmission phase, CSL instructs each node to send the same number of messages. Therefore, the attacker cannot 
identify the sink node. CSL is selected as the authors followed the same idea of generating fake packets. Obviously, 
this scheme consumes the limited node's residual energy. Based on the previous setup, Figures 3 shows the average 
residual energy (the average of the residual energy of all nodes in the network) per iteration using the proposed 
scheme F-CSH and CSL with different configurations of the number of messages sent by every node. As shown in 
the figure, the proposed fuzzy scheme decreases of the average residual energy in acceptable way compared to the 
stated CSL that forces each node to send the same number of messages like the nearby nodes to the sink node. 
     
Fig. (1): Membership Functions for input parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 Fig. (2): Intelligent fake node selection approaches.         Figure (3): The Average energy of the node comparison.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a novel privacy-preserving scheme applying intelligent fake sink node topology to 
protect the location privacy of BS. In which, F-CSL based on the concealing of the main sink using fake sink nodes 
been elected using fuzzy score function. Based on, the sink location could be parasitized with dummy sink nodes. 
The carried out simulations and comprehensive analysis have evaluated the performance and revealed that the 
scheme can effectively secure the sink location with satisfied energy consumption and delivery time compared with 
others.  In the future, the work will be extended to enhance sink privacy with multiple path segments in mobility 
control. 
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Input: A sensor network with S = {s1… sn} source nodes, n source packets xsi ,........, xsn. 
The sink node broadcasts identification message 
Phase 1 “Neighbours discovery”: foreach nodei do 
  1. Estimate how far from the sink node using the RSSI. 
  2. Broadcast to the neighbor nodes, the identifier and the distance to the sink node. 
  3. Neighbor nodes save the received information to be used in further routing. 
 
Phase 2 “Fake Sink holes announcement”: foreach nodei do 
  1. Calculate then broadcast the fuzzy score. 
  2. The highest fuzzy score nodes be the fake sink holes of the current round. 
  3. Other nodes select their fake sink holes based on the fuzzy score or RSSI. 
 
Phase 3 ”Data delivery paths”: foreach For all intermediate nodes on the path to the real sink do 
    Send multi-casted packet for the selected fake sink and the randomly nearest neighbors. 
 
                                                        Algorithm 1: Fake Sink Node algorithm 
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